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Abstract 
In the autumn of 2003 newspaper headlines declared that Environment 
Commissioner Margot Wallström had poison in her blood. After a blood test 28 
hazardous chemicals were found, among these DDT that had been abandoned 
from the market since 1983. In this thesis the reader will find a case study on the 
EU’s chemical Regulation REACH (Regulation, Evaluation, Authorisation of 
Chemicals). REACH has been one of the most controversial and ambitious 
proposals that the Commission has ever put forward replacing 40 Directives and 
Regulations into one. REACH has been surrounded by conflicting interests which 
are divided into two camps; environmentalists versus industry-friendly. Lobbyism 
from both camp has been intense, which can be explained by the interests that are 
at stake, for instance the chemical industry in the EU employs about three million 
people. Despite these conflicting interests a compromise that was acceptable for 
most actors involved were reached; this puzzles me. The purpose of this thesis is 
to explain why they reached an acceptable outcome. In order to conduct my study 
three perspectives have been used. Two-level game theory helps too recognise 
that the inter- and intra- institutional negotiations are interdependent and affect 
one another. However, two-level game is not sufficient since negotiations take 
place between several actors at all levels, therefore policy network analysis are 
functioning as a complementary theory. To explain the interactions between the 
inter- and intra- institutional negotiations I have used the concept of 
communicative action where I claim that both arguing and bargaining are present, 
but in order to reach the final compromise arguing function as the problem-solver. 
 The conclusion of the study is that the outcome can be explained by the 
institutional structure i.e. the co-decision procedure which gives rise to coalitions 
and policy networks. Since REACH is a technically and complex Regulation the 
policy networks together with arguing helped the actors the reach an acceptable 
outcome.  
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1 REACH - an act of balance 
“Margot Wallström has poison in her blood” (Karlsson in Dagens Nyheter, 
031106) 
 
In the autumn of 2003, after testing, Environment Commissioner Margot 
Wallström found the presence of 28 hazardous chemicals in her blood. Among the 
chemicals were DDT a substance which has been abandoned from the market 
since 1983 (Saltmarsh, International Herald Tribune, 061028). The drive to 
pursue a new policy on chemicals came after regulatory failures such as the BSE 
scandal and from rising concerns about exposure of citizens from hazardous 
chemicals (Petry et al., 2006: 26). A new chemical regulation was voted for in the 
European Parliament (EP) on the 13
th
 of December 2006 and in the European 
Council a few days later after about eight years of negotiations. The so called 
REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation of Chemicals) Regulation will 
reverse the burden of proof ensuring that companies, importers and manufacturers 
of chemicals will provide testing for at least 30 000 out of the 100 000 chemicals 
being on the European market today; substances of high concern will 
progressively be replaced by less dangerous ones (Council of the European Union, 
061218).  
REACH has been one of the most controversial and ambitious proposals that 
the Commission has ever put forward replacing 40 Directives into one Regulation, 
which in practice means that it will cut red tape i.e. decrease bureaucracy, 
although adding new obligations on manufacturers and importers in order to 
control and regain trust in the use of chemicals (International Herald Tribune, 
061214). All actors participating in the negotiations both in formal and informal 
ways agreed on one thing: that a new Regulation was necessary in order to 
manage chemical risks as a consequence of lack of sufficient safety information 
on widely used chemicals and because of the increased risk aversion among the 
European citizens (Petry et al., 2006: 31). “The question is not whether REACH 
should exist at all, but how best to strike a balance between regulation and 
competitiveness.” (The Economist, 061209) The mutual understanding that a 
Regulation was necessary was also due to the enormous amount of money that the 
industry put into lobbying campaigns in order to slow down the costs of REACH 
(ibid.). The interests on REACH have been split into two camps: industry-friendly 
versus environmentalists and this polarised relationship is also mirrored at most 
levels i.e. in most institutions and in the member states. Lobbyism has been harsh 
from both camps at all levels and can simply be explained by the interests that 
were put at stake. The chemical industry including plastics and rubber generates 
about 3.2 million jobs in Europe and approximately 60 000 companies (Saltmarsh, 
International Herald Tribune, 061028).   
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The Regulation on REACH did not make any of the camps thrilled, but the 
compromise was more or less acceptable to all actors involved. The negotiations 
on REACH can be seen as a groundbreaking and successful case of problem-
solving, which can be important for future institutional negotiations in the 
European Union. In this thesis the case of REACH will be the centre of attention; 
this case can say something about inter- and intra- institutional negotiations, 
which can be useful in future studies on technical and complex issues in the EU.  
1.1 Research Purpose and Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the inter- and intra- institutional negotiations 
leading to the final compromise on REACH. Why is this important to study? As 
mentioned REACH has been one of the most complex and technical issues in the 
history of the European Union (The Economist, 061209), and by studying why the 
actors involved managed to find a solution that was acceptable to almost all 
participants taking part of the negotiations can be a useful tool for future complex 
inter-and intra- institutional negotiations in the EU. The outcome of REACH can 
be seen as a good example of constructive problem-solving on technically 
complex issues between institutions and as a consequence give confidence to 
these institutions and actors involved. The puzzle is why they reached this 
compromise since there were strong conflicting interests between institutions, 
member states, parties, stakeholders and lobby organisations. Was it because of 
the negotiations, the institutional structures, the strategies of the negotiators or 
because of consensus seeking rather than pursuing self-interest? These are the 
questions this study will discuss, however the main question is following: 
 
• Why did the EP and the Council reach a compromise on the chemical 
regulation REACH that was more or less acceptable to all stakeholders 
involved?  
1.2 Previous Research 
The bookshelves on the final negotiations on REACH are so far empty and that 
can simply be explained by time; the REACH negotiations were finalised in 
December 2006. However at Lund University Matilda Broman is writing a PhD 
on the topic “Taking Advantage of Institutional Possibilities. Swedish Strategic 
Institutional Action – Transparency and REACH”. The study will be conducted 
  3 
by using rationalist institutionalism and negotiation theory.
1
 It is easier to find 
information on inter-institutional negotiations foremost on the balance of power 
between the EP and the Council. For instance Tsebelis and Garrett has made a 
study on the effects concerning the balance of power between the European 
institutions of the EU’s changing Treaty base in “The Institutional Foundations of 
Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union” (2001). Also 
Hix has made a study on the increased power the EP gained through the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in “Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule 
Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam” (2002). 
However these studies foremost concerns the Treaty negotiations and to what 
extent the balance of power changed between the European institutions, whereas 
my study deals with inter-institutional negotiations when the EP and the Council 
function as co-legislators. Tsebelis and Kalandrakis’ “The European Parliament 
and the environmental legislation: The case of chemicals” investigates the impact 
that the EP has on chemical legislation introduced under the Cooperation 
procedure. Annica Kronsell has made a study on the Swedish relations to the 
European environmental policy and the case of chemicals (Kronsell in Johansson 
(eds.), 1999: 190-207). However I have not come across a study that both 
addresses intra-as well as the inter-institutional negotiations under the co-decision 
procedure in the EU. My study will address both these types of negotiations and I 
argue that negotiations cannot be conducted in the setting of the European Union 
without addressing both levels of negotiations since they are interconnected.   
1.3 Theoretical Overview – Three Perspectives  
The aim of this thesis is to explain the outcome of the negotiations on REACH. In 
order to do so I have consulted a broad variety of academic literature and 
considered different perspectives. My perspectives derive from three different 
theories: two-level game, policy network and communicative action; all these will 
be dealt with in chapter two. Three perspectives will be used since no one is 
sufficient in itself to explain the outcome of the negotiations; therefore they 
should be regarded as complementary theories. The perspectives used in order to 
explain the outcome of the negotiations are following: 
 
• The use of two-level game plays a significant role of the outcome of the 
negotiations i.e. the intra-and- inter institutional negotiations are connected 
 
• Policy networks have an impact on how policy preferences arise and how 
actors participate in the negotiations on REACH. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Search for Matilda Broman at the homepage for the Political Science Department at Lund University at 
www.svet.lu.se. I also own Matilda a thanks for the discussions we have had on REACH. 
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• Communicative action had an impact on the outcome of the negotiations on 
REACH. 
 
  
By using rational choice institutionalism and Putnam’s two-level game (Putnam, 
1988). I will try to see what impact this has had on the negotiations. Rational 
choice institutionalists regard actors of acting out of self-interest (Rosamond, 
2000: 116), however I claim that two-level game will not be a sufficient theory to 
answer the question on the outcome of REACH. Therefore my second perspective 
is that policy networks can be used as a complementary theory. My third 
perspective relates to Risse’s concept of communicative action, where I claim that 
the conduct of arguing rather than bargaining affected the outcome of the 
negotiations (Risse, 2000). 
1.4 Method and Material  
To get familiar with a case often involves gathering easily accessible information, 
this is called “soaking and poking”, which often leads to “the construction of a 
chronological narrative” in order to get an overview of the case (George – 
Bennett, 2005: 89). This is also the method I have used when conducting my case 
study. 
1.4.1 REACH as a case study 
In this study a case study is in the centre of attention. I will use following 
definition:  
  
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 2003: 13) 
 
By looking at REACH and in what way the negotiations were conducted we can 
add valuable information to future complex negotiations within the Union. 
However my aim is not to make a grand generalisation, rather to theoretically 
explain the outcome of a phenomenon, namely inter- and- intra institutional 
negotiations. Case studies as well as experiments are both “generalizable to 
theoretical propositions” (Yin, 2003: 10). Lundquist even question if 
generalizations on case studies are interesting, where he claims that the power of 
“the good example” are underestimated (Lundquist, 1993: 105 and Flyvbjerg 
quoted in Lundquist). One of the most famous single case studies is Graham 
Allison’s study (1971) on the Cuban Missile Crisis, this event not only showed 
that a single case can be relevant for research on various different theoretical 
issues (George – Bennett, 2005: 70), but according to Yin it also: “forcefully 
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demonstrates how a single-case study can be the basis for significant explanations 
and generalizations.” (Yin, 2003: 4) Also Lijphart argues that cases can be 
selected because they are interesting in themselves, without generating 
generalizations or building theories, however case studies that are interesting per 
se can add important contributions to propositions that can be used as a ground for 
theory-building in coming research (Lijphart: 691).    
1.4.2 Interviews 
In order to conduct this study I have done interviews with civil servants, MEPs 
and actors representing NGOs, all interviewees have good knowledge of the 
negotiations on REACH. The interviews will be used in relation to other empirical 
material. The characters of the interviews are that of informant, i.e. to get a 
“witness” account of the process (Esaiasson et al., 2004: 253). By doing research I 
came across persons that were frequently mentioned in the context of the REACH 
negotiations. These persons were contacted through e-mail with various degrees 
of response. I have also used the so called “snowball-effect”, which means that 
persons that were recommended to me from other interviewees were contacted. I 
actively choosed to contact persons representing different institutions and interests 
in order to get a somewhat clear picture. The questions were structured according 
to different themes so the interviews can be said to be guided rather than 
structured (Yin, 2003: 89).  In the end of the interview the interviewee were asked 
if he or she wished to add something to clear things out if necessary (Esaiasson et 
al. 2004: 291). All interviews were conducted by telephone and consisted 
approximately 30 minutes. Afterwards a fair copy of my notes were made (ibid., 
294). A problem with the interviews is that three out of five were done to persons 
who are Swedish, this was not an active choice from my side, but of all persons 
that were contacted (approximately 20 persons) representing different institutions 
and with various nationalities, most responses came from Swedish 
representatives. In order to deal with this problem I have interpreted my sources 
critically, they are representing different institutions and interests and not the 
Swedish nation as such. 
1.4.3 Critics of the written sources 
When collecting material for the case study it is vital to ask why certain 
information and situations appear as they do. It is also important to bear in mind 
that documents are written for certain purposes and for certain people (Yin, 2003: 
87). These are facts that I have had in mine when conducting my case study, 
especially since most of the documents consulted are produced by institutions or 
newspapers with specific interests in the REACH negotiations. To confront this 
problem different kinds of material have been used, foremost official documents, 
newspaper articles, and interviews in order to get a “fair” picture of the process. In 
some situations like the Council negotiations and the internal negotiations in the 
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Commission no available sources exist, in these situations I have had to rely on 
official documentation and secondary sources. Esaiasson et al. claim that there are 
four criteria that need to be addressed when collecting material, these are: 
authencity, independence, contemporaneous and tendency (2004: 304, my 
translation). Authencity simply means that the source must be genuine; consulting 
several independent sources to confirm its authencity can solve this problem as 
well as the independence and tendency problem. Using primary material can also 
solve the independence problem; although to what degree the source is 
independent needs to be taken into consideration. Contemporaneous can be 
confronted by using material that are produced close in time of, in this case, the 
negotiations (ibid., 307-312). When conducting my study I have dealt with these 
criteria by using various sources to confirm facts, I have also used material that 
have been produced close in time i.e. produced short after the negotiations and 
throughout the study I have had a critical attitude towards my sources.   
1.5 Disposition 
The aim of this thesis was introduced in the first chapter together with the 
research question as well as the motivation of the importance of REACH as a 
case. The first chapter also contained a broad theoretical overview; where I 
presented three perspectives that will be used in order to explain the outcome of 
the negotiations. Method and material were also addressed together with critics of 
the sources. In chapter 2 the institutional structure i.e. the co-decision procedure 
will be presented, that presentation can be regarded as a theoretical springboard 
where I take a closer look at the three perspectives: two-level game, policy 
networks and communicative action. In chapter 3 the reader will find a 
chronologically overview on the REACH negotiations; how it all started until the 
second reading. In the following chapter the theories presented in chapter 2 are 
used in order to analyse the process and the negotiations. The thesis ends with a 
conclusion on why the specific outcome was reached.   
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2  Theoretical Takeoff 
In this chapter the institutional structure i.e. the co-decision procedure will be 
presented. The institutional structure will function as a springboard to the three 
theoretical perspectives that will be used in this study. 
2.1 Co-decision 
The co-decision procedure was established by the Maastricht Treaty and extended 
by the Amsterdam Treaty. In principle it means that the European Parliament and 
the Council may not adopt legislation without the other’s assent (Commission – 
Secretariat-General – Codecision –“ the Codecision Procedure”). 
Hix means that there are a general agreement among theorists that the balance 
of power between the Council and the European Parliament were changed by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which means that policies can not be adopted without the 
support from both the EP and Council (Hix, 2005: 105). This modification was to 
the Parliament’s advantage and made it a “co-legislator” with the Council 
(Corbett et al., 2003: 354-355; Hix, 2002: 263, Tsebelis – Garrett, 2001: 358), 
however Burns claims that the European Parliament instead lost power since it 
lost informal means that it used in order to influence the Council and the 
Commission in the legislative procedure (Burns, 2006). The co-decision 
procedure has made both the Council and the EP more important for lobbyists, 
which was clear in the REACH negotiations (Hix, 2005: 211-212). 
In the co-decision procedure on REACH the Commission made a proposal in 
2003, which can be said to have set the agenda of the negotiations. The proposal 
went to the European Parliament and the Council for the first reading; the EP 
came up with an opinion and the ad hoc working groups of the Council prepared a 
common position. The Commission took view of the amendments and on the 
basis of the Commission’s view and the preparations by the ad hoc working 
groups the Council adopted a final common position in June 2006. The EP gave 
an opinion on the Council common position in the Second Reading and in 
negotiations with the Council they decide whether to adopt it or not. If no 
agreement are made the parties will go on to conciliation i.e. every issue is 
negotiated in order to reach agreements (Petry et al., 2004: 25). If the EP and the 
Council do not agree they meet in trialogues together with the Commission. The 
trialogues function as formal negotiation sessions, although without formal 
decisions taken. At a first glance the trialogues can be regarded as quite informal 
since no formal decisions are taken, but instead the trialogues are highly 
restricted; only a few actors are welcome to participate. According to Bjurulf – 
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Elgström the only actors present are: “the Presidency for the Council, two or three 
members of the Parliament delegation and a representative from the 
Commission.” (2005: 55) During the REACH negotiations six trialogues were 
running.  
2.2 Two-level Game 
Hopmann uses two definitions on negotiations; the first one is taken from Iklé 
who defined negotiations as:  
 
“a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose 
of reaching an agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common 
interest where conflicting interests are present.” (Iklé quoted in Hopmann: 1996: 
25) 
 
As well as Hopmann I will use this definition since it addresses a situation where 
both common and conflicting interests are present, which can be applicable to the 
REACH negotiations. Hopmann also defines negotiations as: 
 
“a situation of interdependent decision-making, where two or more parties must 
each make decisions and where the outcome for the parties is not exclusively 
under their own control, but is a result of their joint decisions.” (Hopmann, 
1996: 26)   
These two definitions on negotiations led me to Putnam (1988) that seeks a theory 
that integrates both the domestic and the international spheres and their 
entanglements in negotiations. Although Putnam is focusing on states at the 
domestic and the international level I claim that this theory can be applicable on 
the negotiations on REACH where the European Parliament and the Council are 
in the centre of attention.
2
 Two-level game theory is dealing with two arenas i.e. 
the domestic and the international, that are interconnected through negotiations. 
The actors demand a chief negotiator that are assumed to be independent and 
whose aim is to seek an agreement between the parties (Putnam, 1988: 436).  
Putnam divides the negotiations into two levels: Level 1 where bargaining 
between the negotiators occur leading to an agreement, and level 2 where 
negotiations are held within the institutions whether to ratify the agreement or not. 
The link between these two levels is that Level 2 must ratify a Level 1 agreement. 
Therefore in order to make amendments at Level 2 also negotiations at Level 1 are 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
2 The Commission is also regarded as one of the main actors in the process of REACH, altough not functioning 
as a co-legislator 
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necessary for the final ratification (Putnam, 1988: 436-437). The possibility of an 
agreement depends on especially three factors (ibid., 442ff):
3
  
 
• The preferences, coalitions and distribution of power at Level 2. In the case of 
the negotiations on REACH these are the preferences coalitions and 
distribution of power in the Council and the EP.  
 
• The institutional rules at level 2, such as the institutional structure and 
leadership at level 2. 
 
• The strategies of the negotiators, i.e. the strategies the negotiators have in the 
negotiations between the EP and the Council.  
 
In order to conduct my study I will use these factors to see to what extent they are 
present in the negotiations. However the theory of two-level game assumes that 
actors are rational and try to maximise their own interests. In REACH this is not 
the case. The actors in the final negotiations on REACH did not have fixed 
preferences, instead I claim that they were rather consensus seeking. Therefore I 
will use two further perspectives, policy network and communicative action to 
complement two-level game in order to explain the outcome of the negotiations. 
2.3 Policy Network 
The theory of multi-level governance indicates that decision-making is shared 
between different actors and different levels, where actors and levels are 
interconnected rather than separate units. Multi-level governance tend to focus on 
the different levels rather than on governance. Policy network is a way to put the 
concept of governance back into the multi-level governance (Smith, 1997). 
Jönsson – Strömvik regard: “negotiations as key processes and (...) networks as 
key structures of governance.” (in Elgström - Jönsson, 2005: 14) Networks can be 
defined as that:  
 
“They all share a common understanding, a minimal or lowest common 
determinator definition of a policy network, as a set of relatively stable 
relationships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a 
variety of actors, who share common interests with regard to a policy and who 
exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-
operation is the best way to achieve common goals.” (Börzel, 1997: 1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Putnam talks about “the size of the win-set” which he defines: “...for a given Level II constituency as the set of 
all possible Level I agreements that would ‘win’ – that, is gain the necessary majority among the constituents – 
when simply voted up or down.” (1988: 437) 
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I will use this definition since it emphasizes that the actors share a common 
understanding in order to find a solution, which will be used as a complementary 
view to two-level game. 
Due to the expansion of the co-decision procedure by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, policy networks increased to a large extent (Peterson – Bomberg, 
1999: 24-25, 30). The increase of policy networks was due to the complex, 
sectoral structure of decision-making and of policy growth that allowed 
governments to disperse political resources between public and private actors; i.e. 
in order to be more effective and to reach a common solution. Networks include 
all actors that are involved in the formulation of a policy, their interactions are 
characterised by informality and by its participants that are both public and 
private. The participants have interdependent interests and they are striving to 
reach a solution  (Börzel, 1997: 5-6).  
The advantages of policy networks are several: First, the presence of public 
and private actors in policy networks can help identifying policy problems and its 
solutions at an early stage of the policy formation process. Second, policy 
networks help gathering information about the policy and positions among 
stakeholders that otherwise would not have been available. Third, policy networks 
create an environment of consensus building, which can limit negotiation 
deadlocks (Besussi, 2006: 9). However, Börzel argues that policy network is not 
the final solution to the problems of decision-making; they can become “quasi-
institutional” with internal problems of co-ordination and there is always the 
problem that it suffer from lack of legitimacy. What makes it special is that policy 
network creates an arena for communicative action, which will be addressed in 
next chapter (Börzel: 1996: 6, 11). 
Networks of the European Union are often issue-based and a combination of 
“know-how” and “know-who”, the combination of the technical expertise and 
organizational actors make the networks an arena where successful outcomes are 
likely to be negotiated (Jönsson – Strömvik, 2005: 18). Who are the main actors in 
these networks? The Commission is often regarded as a linking pin organisation 
i.e. it functions as a communication channel where it has good knowledge of 
“know-who” and are also reachable and dependent on information from various 
actors including NGOs. The Parliament also function as a linking-pin organisation 
and for many NGOs the only possibility to do lobbying (Jönsson – Strömvik, 
2005: 18-19).  
Policy network will function as a complement to two-level games, where the 
participants are regarded as actors in an issue-based network. I will investigate 
who these actors are and foremost focus on lobbyism. However in order to 
understand the outcome of the negotiations we need to complement policy 
network with a negotiation theory of communicative action, where the 
negotiations are characterised by arguing rather than bargaining.   
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2.4 Communicative Action 
Arguing and bargaining are concepts that derive from two different theories; the 
latter relates to rationalism, whereas the former is part of the theory on 
communicative action.
4
 Bargaining can be said to make promises or threats 
through communication where the intent is to change behaviour (Müller, 2004: 
396, 397; Risse, 2000: 8). In order to understand why actors can make a 
compromise and reach a common understanding the concept of arguing plays a 
major role. The actors must share a definition of the rules of the game in order to 
reach a successful outcome of the negotiations, and to reach consensus actors 
must be prepared to change their standpoints and preferences (Risse, 2000: 2). 
Risse adopts the concept “logic of arguing” which means that actors try to seek a 
common understanding of the situation and are open to be persuaded by the better 
argument, where power relations and social hierarchies stay in the background. 
Arguing is goal-oriented exactly as the logic of consequentialism and rational 
choice behaviour, the difference is that the goal is not to maximise its own 
interests, but rather to reach consensus (ibid., 7). Here, the question of being 
persuaded by the better argument comes in; Holzinger means that arguing is part 
of strategic action by actors. She claims that bargaining is necessary in order to 
deal with conflicting interests and to set the big framework, whereas arguing 
solves problem on divergences on detailed issues, she cotinue and claims that: 
“arguing happens ‘almost always’ within a strategic context”. (Holzinger in 
Müller, 2004: 272). The logic of arguing requires “ideal speech situations” where 
power relations are equal, this has been criticised, since it is difficult to find such 
settings in international politics. However, Risse argues that: “[t]he real issue then 
is not whether power relations are absent in a discourse, but to what extent they 
can explain the argumentative outcome.” (Risse, 2000: 18) In order to 
operationalise the concept of arguing in my study I will look at following 
conditions taken from Niemann: 
 
•  The actors must share a common life world, in order to identify the rules of 
the game, norms and values.  
 
• Lack of knowledge and uncertainties motivates the actors to consider new 
views and information and to learn, since truth seeking is the goal.  
 
• Technical issues require expert knowledge and the more complex issue the 
more validity claims about what is the best thing requires.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 The concept “communicative action” comes from Habermas and indicates that actors apart from strategic 
action also uses communicative action in order to reach a common understanding and consensus without trying 
to maximise its own utility (Niemann, 2004: 380). 
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• There is a need for lengthy discussions both formal and informal. With short 
time, truth seeking can be difficult.  
 
• Persuasive individuals are required, since the force of the better argument 
plays a significant role of the outcome of the negotiations (Niemann, 2004: 
385-386).   
 
In sum, by using two-level game theory, the two different Levels of negotiations 
and more importantly that they are interconnected, are defined, however two-level 
game theory requirer that the actors are acting in self-interest and that their 
preferences are fixed, which is no the case in the REACH negotiations. Policy 
networks help us to understand that there are various actors at different levels 
present in the negotiations. Also, the influence of lobbyism is addressed. But in 
order to combine these two perspectives communicative action will serve as glue, 
where the goal is to reach a common solution. 
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3 REACH in Brief 
In this chapter the stages of REACH will be addressed chronologically; from the 
White paper in 2001 until the Second reading, in order to get an overview of the 
process. The chapter will also be technical when I outline the most important 
features of Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation, which I find important 
since the concepts will be used throughout the thesis. 
3.1 The White Paper 
Following concerns by the Environmental Council regarding lack of information 
on hazardous chemicals and concerns about the complex and inconsistent 
regulations on chemicals within the EU, the Council launched a brainstorming 
round with different stakeholders in order to call upon the Commission to propose 
a new chemical strategy by the end of 2000 (Council document 11265/99). The 
Commission adopts the White paper on a Strategy for Future Chemical Policy on 
the 13
th
 of February 2001 after taking into account the Communication on the 
Competitiveness of the Chemical Industry, the Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle, which is a legal framework for risk management (Petry 
et al., 2006: 26), submissions made by stakeholders and analyses made by 
member states. The White paper was produced under co-responsibility by the DG 
enterprise and DG environment (Commission – enterprise and industry – 
“REACH – Background”). The White paper acknowledges numerous of 
weaknesses in the current system; foremost regarding lack of knowledge about the 
degree of danger of many chemicals, which makes it difficult to assess their risks 
and to decide what kind of control that is required. Another weakness of the old 
legislation is that the system of risk assessment is too slow and that resources are 
put on “new” chemicals that just entered the market but only accounts of one per 
cent of the total volume, whereas it should be necessary to focus on “existing” 
chemicals already in use (Commission – enterprise and industry - “REACH – 
Introduction”, Commission – “REACH in Brief”, 2007: 3). The goal of the White 
paper is “sustainable development”, i.e. to find the balance between environment, 
economic and social policies. Thus to protect humanity and environment, but at 
the same time keep the competitiveness of the chemical industry. The main 
features of the White Paper are Registration, Evaluation and 
Authorisation/Restrictions, which will be addressed in the end of this chapter. 
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3.2 The Commission Proposal 
The Commission adopted the proposal for a new regulatory framework for 
chemicals on the 29
th
 of October 2003. The proposal was drafted in close 
cooperation with stakeholders in an Internet consultation
5
, which has allowed the 
Commission to “propose a streamlined and cost-effective system” (Commission, 
IP/03/1477). The Internet consultation was open to public and 6000 replies were 
registered. The participants mainly represented industry organisations and 
environmental NGOs, although companies, member states, states outside the EU, 
animal rights organisations as well as individuals also contributed with their views 
(ibid.). The aim of the Commission proposal: 
 
“...are to improve the protection of human health and the environment while 
maintaining the competitiveness and enhancing the innovative capability of the 
EU chemical industry.” (Commission homepage: “The New EU Chemicals 
Legislation – REACH) 
 
Another aim of the proposal was to give greater responsibility to industry to 
provide safety information and to manage the potential risks from chemicals that 
are in use (Commission IP/03/1477). The proposal was submitted to the European 
Parliament and the Council for the first reading. 
In order to be prepared of the consequences and to assess the costs of the 
legislation the Commission focused on conducting “impact assessment” studies. 
The Commission studies were complemented by the “Memorandum of 
Understanding between the European Commission side (...) and industry” (2004). 
Several case studies were conducted and they were monitored by a High Level 
Group, which consisted of representatives from the Commission, the Council 
Presidency and the European Parliament (“Note on the studies undertaken in the 
framework of the Memorandum”, 050427). Here, the industry played a major role 
in pursuing studies and Commissioner Verheugen acknowledged that: “ 
 
“These studies make an important contribution to better assess the changes 
needed to achieve a balanced and workable solution for REACH which will be 
compatible also with our Lisbon goals to improve the competitiveness of 
European industry, including SME’s. The Commission believes that these 
results should be taken into account in the co-decision process and to that end 
reaffirms its intention to cooperate closely with the European Parliament and the 
Council.” (Commission, IP/05/495) 
 
In March 2003 the European Council decided that the Competitiveness Council 
should be more involved in the process, which according to Gerhagty was a 
consequence of the impact assessments required by industry (Geraghty, 2005: 33). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 The entire consultation can be viewed on the Commission homepage: http://ec.europa.eu/enter-
prise/reach/consultation_en.htm 
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3.3 The First Reading 
The first reading in the European Parliament was led by the Environment 
Committee (ENVI). Special regards were taken to the Industry Committee 
(INDRE) and the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
(IMCO). Seven other committees were also commenting on REACH. In the first 
reading a broad political majority of the EP agreed on amendments on 
registration: data requirements for 1 – 10 tonnes of chemicals (as opposed to the 
impact assessments of the Commission), maintaining responsibility on industry to 
make information available on risks on existing chemicals and continue to make 
full data on new substances. Also, substances of high concern have to provide full 
sets of safety data. Substances that are manufactured or imported between 10-100 
tonnes will require certain tests, the Parliament also agreed upon “one-substance, 
one registration”. On authorisation, also a big majority agreed on considering 
available substitutes if safer. The first reading in the EP was completed on 17 
November 2005 (European Parliament, 051118). The modifications were a result 
from negotiations between the two largest political blocs in the EP, the centre-left 
European Socialists (PES) and the centre-right European People’s Party (PPE) 
(ibid.). 
The Council adopted a common position on the 27th of June 2006; although 
Germany delayed the process, since a new government was elected (Buck, 
Financial Times, 051111). Among the changes that the Council introduced from 
the Commission proposal were: reduced information on lower volumes, “one 
substance, one registration”, which means that registrants should share data and 
cooperate if using the same substances, exemption of low-risk substances, such as 
pulp and strengthening of the provisions for substituting the most dangerous 
substances to authorisation by ensuring that all authorisations are reviewed (UK 
Presidency – Environmental Protection: Chemicals). The industry foremost 
approved by granting authorisation on a regular basis, rather than having strictly 
time-limited authorisation. Also, the Council did not adopt a position that 
substitution should be introduced as a mandatory procedure (CEFIC – “EU 
Chemicals Policy Review (REACH)). Industry organisations such as CEFIC 
approved of the Council position since it: “managed to strike the right balance in 
combining the need to protect human health and environment, and concerns about 
workability and competitiveness of the European industry[.]” (ibid.) 
The differences between the EP and Council positions at first reading were not 
that far apart and they were foremost concerning the authorisation element, where 
there were disagreements on time limits. The Parliament position was to limit the 
possibility of high-risk substances being authorised when they are “adequately 
controlled” (UK Presidency – Environmental Protection: Chemicals). Although 
the position were no that far apart the Council common position included only 
180 of the 430 amendments that were approved by the EP after their first reading, 
but these included the big questions on registration and evaluation 
(Europaparlamentet: “REACH: the second half kicks of, 060713). 
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The Commission welcomed the Council’s version of REACH, although it was a 
watered-down version of their original proposal. The more satisfied of the two 
Commissioners were Verheugen claiming that the Council had “succeeded in 
making Reach more effective and more workable.” (Scott, Chemical Week, 
051221-051228)  
3.4 The Second Reading 
The positions between the Council and the Parliament were not that far apart after 
the first reading, but “the devil is in the details”. (Scott, Chemical Week, 060426) 
The second reading in the European Parliament begun in the end of June 2006. 
Chief negotiator in the EP, Guido Sacconi, considered it necessary to: “restate its 
position on tightening up the procedure for authorizing chemical substances by 
promoting the replacement of the most dangerous among them.” (Sissel, Chemical 
Week, 060705-060712). The statement was clear: the big question in the second 
reading was that of substitution. But Sacconi would also focus on questions 
regarding: duty of care, the EP’s role in the European Chemicals Agency, aid to 
SMEs, quality marking, animal experiments and compulsory evaluation of 
substances that are likely to be cancerous, mutagenic or genotoxic 
(Europaparlamentet: “REACH: the second half kicks of, 060713).  
However, compromises come at price, Sacconi highlights that the negotiations 
must be on give-and-take basis, he claims that: “[f]or the moment, all EU 
institutions have played their game, saying it is very difficult for them to make a 
move. Well, for me too it is difficult!” then he continues: “As long as the 
Commission and the Council’s official stance is to hold on to the [Council] 
common position, I will stick with the Parliament’s position in first reading[.]” 
(EurActiv, 061002) The Finnish Presidency made a clear statement that they 
wanted a decision reached by the end of the year (2006) (Europaparlamentet – 
“REACH: the second half kicks of”, 060713). In a speech the Finnish Minister for 
Trade and Industry, Mauri Pekkarinen, said that “...the Finnish Presidency will do 
its utmost, with the support of the commission, in reaching the best possible 
outcome in the negotiations with the European Parliament.” (Pekkarinen, 061027) 
Amendments to the first reading position can only be done in plenary by 
quality majority voting (QMV); normally only simple majority is required. These 
compromise amendments are often negotiated in advance between the Parliament 
and the Council, which also Sacconi confirmed was the case of REACH 
(EurActiv, 061003). The vote is based on the recommendations from the 
Environment Committee (Rogers, Cemistry World). If the negotiations between 
the Council and the Parliament went well the vote in the second reading would 
just be a formality, otherwise the decision can take several months further and be 
made up in the conciliation process (ibid.). The Environment Committee of the 
Parliament voted on the 10
th
 of October 2006 on the draft REACH regulation and 
backed stricter environmental rules than the Council position, but quality majority 
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voting in plenary in the EP must still approve the rules. (White, theparliament, 
061010). 
In the right end the Council did not move their position an inch and 
negotiations broke down after a long night on the 27
th
 of November 2006.  The 
main question of the negotiations was on authorisation and substitution. Several 
member states, “Germany and its allies”, are opposing, as well as the EPP-ED in 
the Parliament. These parties will allow companies to use toxic and 
cancerogenous chemicals as long as they are “adequately controlled”, the 
opponents question the definition of this concept (White, theparliament, 061128). 
After the break down in the negotiations the Greens, GUE/NGL and ALDE were 
discussing to push the process towards conciliation. However, “new chemistry 
was found” and the negotiations between the EP and the Council were finished in 
the end of November when they agreed on a compromise package put forward by 
the Finnish Presidency. The three largest party groups in the EP, the Socialists 
(PES), the Conservatives (EPP-ED) and the liberals (ALDE) made the deal 
(Europaportalen).  
The final agreement meant that the question on substitution was not as 
environmental friendly as recommended by the Environment Committee. Sacconi 
admitted that he had to: “scale down his level of ambition following concerns by 
Germany and industry groups that the regulation would be too costly for the 
chemical sector.” (EurActiv, 061204)  
In sum, both the EP and the Council position changed and converged during 
the final negotiations. In the European Parliament the Greens and GUE/NGL were 
extremely disappointed, however the Parliament made the position much more 
environmental friendly than the common Council position. But compared to the 
original Commission proposal the final outcome was watered-down from an 
environmental point of view. The industry sector was content by the compromise, 
although not thrilled. In the next chapter I will outline the main features of the 
“technical REACH” since the concepts will be used throughout the thesis. 
3.4.1 Registration, Evaluation, Authoriation/Restrictions 
 
Registration: Manufactures and importers have to gather information on and 
register the chemicals that they use, produce or import at volumes of one tonne or 
more. The registration will be managed at the European Chemicals Agency in 
Helsinki. For volumes of more than ten tonnes a year companies must give 
information on the hazards of each substance in a Chemical Safety Report. 
(Commission – “REACH in Brief”, 2007: 6). To reduce animal testing, data 
sharing is required (ibid., 10). To reduce costs for industry all manufactureres and 
importers can share data on registered substances i.e. “one substance, one 
registration.” (European Parliament, 051118)  
Evaluation:  Two types of evaluation will be conducted: dossier evaluation 
and substance evaluation. The former is used to make quality checks of 
registration dossiers and checking of testing proposals so that not unnecessary 
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animal testing or repetition tests are done. The latter is used when there is belief 
that the substance can be a risk for human health and the environment. In the 
evaluation process the Chemicals Agency play a major role in developing 
guidance on prioritisation of substances for evaluation. The member states prepare 
lists of the substances they wish to evaluate. High concern substances will go to a 
mandatory authorisation process (Commission – “REACH in Brief”, 2007: 11-
12). 
Authorisation: In the authorisation stage the Commission is responsible for 
granting or refusing substances. Here, the most hazardous chemicals will be under 
the magnifier. Applicants have to guarantee that the risks associated with the 
substance are adequately controlled if authorisation will be granted. Authorisation 
can also be granted if the socio-economic benefits outweigh the risks and there are 
no safer alternatives. If safer alternatives are available the applicant must provide 
a substitution plan. If no better alternative exists a research and development plan 
must be provided (Commission – “REACH in Brief”, 2007: 12-13). Risk reducing 
and restrictions are elements that are introduced when the risks are unacceptable, 
it can be regarded as a safety net of the system. Substances that are restricted 
cannot be manufactured, used or imported in the EU. The member states prepare 
proposals for substances that they prefer should be restricted in a structured 
dossier to the Commission (Petry et al., 25-26). 
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4 Theoretical Analysis 
In this chapter the REACH negotiations will be analysed in order to explain the 
outcome of the compromise. The analysis is conducted by using the three 
theoretical perspectives: two-level game, policy network and communicative 
action. 
4.1 REACH as a Two-level game 
Two-level game can partly explain the outcome of the REACH negotiations, 
foremost the structures of the negotiations; as claimed earlier the possibility of an 
agreement depends on three factors: (1) The preferences and coalitions and 
distribution of power in the Council and in the EP. (2) The institutional rules such 
as institutional structure. (3) The strategies of the negotiator, which is the 
negotiations between the Council and the EP. 
 
4.1.1 Preferences and coalitions 
Putnam claims that: “Any testable two-level theory of international negotiation 
must be rooted in a theory of domestic politics, (...) a theory about power and 
preferences of the major actors at Level II.” (1988: 442) The theories that I will 
use focus on coalition building in the Parliament and in the Council. Coalitions 
can be defined as: “a set of actors that coordinate their behaviour in order to reach 
goals they have agreed upon.” (Rasch quoted in Elgström et al., 2001: 113) In the 
Parliament the two major parties divide questions between them in order to gain 
power, but also to show that the Parliament can act as a united actor towards the 
Council and the Commission (Hix, 2005: 99). In the Council we can simply 
outline an environmental bloc and an industry-friendly bloc i.e. we can draw the 
conclusion that the coalitions are issue-specific, although the environmental bloc 
foremost consists of the Nordic countries which can be claimed to be norm-
sharing in environmental policies (Elgström et al., 2001: 119-121).  
As discussed in chapter 2 the Parliament has gained power with the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure, because of its extended role as co-
legislator together with the Council. However the EP is often regarded and acts as 
one actor with a single interest. Hix means that this is to promote its own power in 
relation to the Council and the Commission. In the second reading, amendments 
from the first reading must be taken by absolute majority of all MEPs. This 
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system gives rise to coalitions among the parties and encourages cooperation 
foremost between the two largest groups. When an absolute majority is required it 
is almost impossible to “win” without the support of one of the largest party 
groups in the EP, which means that  PES and EPP-ED have great power compared 
to the smaller groups that can be regarded as marginalized (Hix, 2005: 96-97). In 
the REACH negotiations PES and EPP-ED with support from the liberal group 
ALDE made a final agreement on REACH, which did not follow the 
recommendations of the Environment Committee. Shadow rapporteur for ALDE, 
Chris Davies, said that ALDE changed its position because the environment 
spokesperson in EPP coordinated the three party positions so that they were 
acceptable to all three in order to get a final compromise that they could support 
(Interview with Chris Davies, 070510), but to the annoyance of the more 
environmental friendly MEPs in ALDE (SVT - “Lena Ek röstar emot 
kemiuppgörelsen”). This is also confirmed by the shadow rapporteur Jens Holm 
(GUE/NGL) who claims that EPP-ED and PES conduct log rolling because of 
self-interest and to gain power to prove that the EP is a voice to count on in 
relations with the Council and the Commission (Interview with Jens Holm, 
070420). 
The common position in the Council has to be reached by QMV, the voting-
rules gives fuel to coalition-building (Elgström et al., 2001: 114), i.e. in the 
Council it is possible to discern on the one hand a Nordic bloc who are more 
environmental friendly and on the other hand a more industry-friendly bloc with 
Germany as its leader and as Putnam puts it: “[v]arious groups at Level II are 
likely to have quite different preferences on the several issues involved in a multi-
issue negotiation. As a general rule, the group with the greatest interest in a 
specific issue is also likely to hold the most extreme position on that issue.” 
(Putnam, 1988: 446) I believe that this is clear in the case of REACH, where the 
Nordic countries with common and environmental norms and a small chemical 
industry hold the environmental position and Germany, Ireland and Poland held 
the industry-friendly position, because of a large industry sectors in respective 
countries. More surprisingly Malta belonged to the latter group and this can partly 
be explained as a consequence of wanting to belong to the group with strong 
voting-strength (Kaeding – Selck, 2005: 273-274). However there is a powerful 
norm in the decision-making of the Council that: “all steps should be taken to 
preserve at least the appearance of consensus.” (Peterson – Bomberg, 1999: 58) 
Swedish REACH negotiator, Per Bergman, claims that from the early hour 
positions were polarised between the member states, but throughout the process 
positions started to converge and the common position of the Council was taken 
unanimously. During the Council negotiations on the common position, the 
Presidency was held by England. Per Bergman claims that they were “incredible 
skilful” and that they outlined a compromise that were acceptable since it “gave 
something to everyone” (Interview with Per Bergman, 070418). The “dark cloud” 
was Germany, they elected a new government in September and the negotiations 
on REACH were postponed from November until December in order for 
Germany to position itself. Environmental groups were upset by the delayed 
negotiations and claimed that it was the industry that stood behind. However, 
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Bergman claims that: “the British must have worked hard to appease the German 
industry.” (Interview with Per Bergman, 070418) Germany as well as Poland was 
not content about the compromise in the Council, but finally after “skilful 
maneuver” by the British Presidency they accepted and stood by the common 
position (ibid.) 
As outlined in the introductory chapter no-agreement was not an option for 
either of the parties. Putnam argues that: “[n]o-agreement often represents the 
status quo, although in some cases no-agreement may in fact lead to a worsening 
situation[.]” (Putnam, 1988: 442) Both the environmental camp as well as the 
industry camp supported the regulation in itself; the ”devil was in the details”. I 
believe that this shared norm of “no-agreement as not an option” was vital for the 
outcome of the negotiations. All parties shared a common understanding and a 
common interest that an outcome should be reached. The political costs for a no-
agreement would be too high for all parties involved.  
In the REACH negotiations the positions were more or less strong on various 
issues, although the grand coalitions between environmental friendly and 
industry-friendly were consistent; it was a matter of how far the actors could 
stretch their positions in order to make an agreement. 
4.1.2 The institutional structure 
The outcome of negotiations depends on voting-rules and institutional structure 
(Putnam, 1988: 448). The co-decision procedure obliged the Council and the 
Parliament to find a common solution. The procedure put pressure on the 
Presidency to find unanimous agreements in the Council so that it can present a 
united front in the negotiations with the Parliament (Metcalfe, 1998: 419). The 
Council on the other hand often treats the European Parliament as a united part, or 
as ”another member state”. This often gives rise to broad arrangements between 
PES and EPP-ED as discussed above and which Jens Holm claims was the case 
on REACH (Interview Jens Holm 070420). In the REACH negotiations there 
were fear both from the Commission and the Council to go further to conciliation, 
since the Council by tradition often loose ground in the conciliation processes on 
behalf of the Parliament (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510). In the Parliament 
the GUE/NGL and the Greens tried to pressure the negotiations towards 
conciliation, but the PES, EPP-ED and ALDE made their deal just in time or as I 
will claim, they came up with the deal because of the threat for conciliation. Also 
the Council were eager to avoid conciliation since their position would probably 
have been weakened and as Jens Holm put it: “the decision could not have 
worsened our position in a conciliation since it is about give and take” (Interview 
with Jens Holm, 070420). According to Chris Davies claims that conciliation 
comes at a cost i.e. “to negotiate REACH for another four months”. Chris Davies 
continues: “the close was very near and it was time to move on”; although he 
admits that the environmental camp probably would have won a bit more in a 
conciliation (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510).  
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The trialogues functioned as negotiation sessions; the result of the trialogues 
was that both sides were better informed about eachothers’ intentions and 
positions (Corbett et al., 2003: 364). Since the trialogues are part of the 
institutional structure they played a significant role in the outcome of the REACH 
negotiations, since it was after a trialogue session that the parties agreed on a 
compromise.  The sequence of the Presidency might also have some impact on the 
outcome of the negotiations the Finnish Presidency were followed by the 
industry-friendly Germany, although both Chris Davies and Jens Holm claim that 
in the conciliation process it does not matter who has the Presidency. Davies even 
claims that Germany could have made progress in the negotiations since it in 
terms of Presidency must take on a more objective role and he gives the example 
of the emission negotiations that are running at the moment (Spring 2007), where 
Germany in terms of the impartial Presidency actually have made progress in the 
negotiations (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510). 
4.1.3 The strategies of the negotiators 
 
The leadership is also an important part in order to reach an agreement, “the chief 
negotiator is the only link between Level I and Level II.” (Putnam, 1988: 456) 
Malnes describes a leader as someone “with superior problem-solving ability” 
(1995: 91), who “acts on behalf of some larger group” and also function as an 
“agent who makes people do what they would not otherwise have done” (ibid., 
92). A leader “wields his or her influence with a view to promoting some 
collective goal.” (ibid., 93) The strategies of the leader is to maximise both the 
other side’s win-set, which at the same time can risk his or her own bargaining 
position, and on the other hand try to maximize his or her own win-set (Putnam, 
1988: 450); for the leader there is a delicate act of balancing between the two 
Levels in order to reach an acceptable compromise.  
In the parliament Guido Sacconi (PES) was the head negotiator i.e. his role 
was to coordinate the positions in the Parliament that he presented for the Council 
and the Commission. He foremost negotiated with the rapporteurs and the shadow 
rapporteurs i.e. representatives for the different party groups in the EP. Chris 
Davies claimed that one of his roles was to try stopping Sacconi from making a 
compromise with the EPP-ED. “He had an environmental perspective, but he was 
too consensus-seeking.” (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510) However for 
Sacconi the main goal was to reach an acceptable compromise with the Council.  
In the Council, negotiations was lead by the Presidency. In the end game it 
was Finland who lead the negotiations. Finland clearly stated in the beginning of 
their Presidency that they had the intention to reach an agreement before the end 
of the year (Pekkarinen, 061027). Mauri Pekkarinen claimed that: “the council 
should consider some adjustments in the authorisation title without changing the 
essential elements of the concept as agreed in the common position.” (ibid.) He 
also stated that in the discussions with Sacconi that: “there is a strong common 
interest and political will in concluding the negotiations at second reading.” (ibid.) 
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The Finnish Presidency made a “take-it-or-leave-it” package on REACH that the 
Parliament agreed on and as Malnes put is: “a process which permits package 
solutions has better prospects of succeeding than one in which separate solutions 
must be found to single issues.” (Malnes, 1995: 100) Overall, the Finnish 
Presidency held an impartial role in terms of Presidency in the negotiations 
(Interview with Per Bergman, 070418; Interview with Lena Perenius, 070425), 
although Chris Davies claims that they: “...were keen on adopting a strong 
REACH; they were sympathetic to the parliament position.” (Interview with Chris 
Davies, 070510) 
The role of the Commission in the REACH negotiations has been questioned. 
The Commission is not as cohesive as it often is described, instead it is diverse 
and pluralistic with different preferences and cultures at all levels, where both 
Commissioners and DGs and their staff act independently, this can create 
dynamism and conflicts between levels and portfolios in the Commission 
(Nugent, 2001: 8, 206). Conflicting interests are often common between DG 
enterprise and DG environment, and this was also the case in the REACH 
negotiations. The role of the Commission is to lay the first proposal and to act as a 
mediator between the EP and the Council. The Commission also sit on technical 
expertise and in the beginning the Commission was helping Sacconi with 
technical interpretations (Interview with Per Bergman 070418).  Sacconi’s 
opinion on the Commission was not satisfactory: “the institution which has so far 
shown the least flexibility is the Commission. ‘Institutionally, the Commission’s 
task is to facilitate an agreement between legislators [Parliament and Council]’ in 
case of persisting divergence (...) [h]owever , it has so far failed to do so. ‘To 
fulfill this role, you need to have one position, not two[.]’” (EurActiv, 061002). 
Also Jens Holm and Chris Davies argue for the same view on the Commission: 
[t]he role of the Commission was to facilitate agreements between the EP and the 
Council, but how could they do this when they could not even facilitate it between 
themselves?” (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510). Jens Holm claims that both 
Commissioners were negotiating and could say two different things, when they 
were negotiating with the Commission they had to ask who they should talk to. 
And as Chris Davies claims: “Dimas and Verheugen were speaking in different 
languages” (ibid.). Lena Perenius claims that it is not strange with conflicting 
interests: “it’s the same as in national governments” (Interview with Lena 
Perenius 070425). Clearly the different Commissioners had conflicting interests 
on REACH, however to what extent these disagreements affected the outcome is 
difficult to say. Even though they tried to speak with one voice in the negotiations 
this was not the view of the other actors (EP and the Council) and I claim that is 
enough to weaken and damage the position of the Commission in the negotiations.  
The strategy of the negotiators during the REACH negotiations was to reach 
consensus, since a no-agreement was not an option. Both negotiators had to 
negotiate at two levels. Sacconi tried to make a broad political majority in the 
Parliament and since REACH consisted of several issues, coalitions could change 
from issue to issue. The biggest fear from the environmental camp was that 
Sacconi should strike a deal with the more industry-friendly EPP-ED whose 
strategies on the other hand was to wait for the Council position. The strategy in 
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the EP was to make consensus among a majority of the parties in order to have an 
adequate bargaining position at Level 1 with the Council. The negotiations with 
the Council were different from that within the Parliament. In the beginning also 
Sacconi threatened to go further to conciliation, but it did not have an visible 
effect, since the Council position seemed to be firm. However, as Putnam put it: 
“Deals can only be struck if each negotiator must seek to convinced that the 
proposed deal lies within his opposite number’s win-set and thus will be ratified.” 
(1988: 453) The Finnish Presidency wanted to have an agreement in order not to 
loose head.  
In sum, in the REACH negotiations it is a clear division between the 
environmental and the industry-friendly camp. These coalitions can be viewed at 
all levels in the negotiations; in the Council, in the Parliament and in the 
Commission. The question was not to change positions, but rather to stretch their 
positions in order to agree on a compromise. The co-decision procedure made an 
impact on the agreement since the Parliament and the Council functioned as co-
legislators and had to come up with a compromise; also the fear of conciliation 
were present. The sequence of the Presidency to not have a significant impact 
since Germany had to act as an impartial broker in terms of Presidency and the 
conciliation process is a matter of give and take.  
By looking at preferences and coalitions in the EP and the Council, the 
institutional structure and the strategies of the negotiators we will get a somewhat 
simplified view of the negotiations. In reality the negotiations also consisted of 
numerous other actors such as lobby groups, committees in the Parliament and 
domestic interests in the member states. In order to get the whole picture we need 
to discuss to what extend these actors were present and affected the outcome of 
the negotiations. Also in order to understand the outcome it is important to view 
how the negotiations were conducted, was it arguing rather than hard bargaining, 
was consensus-seeking the big goal? These questions will be addressed by using 
policy network theory and the theory of communicative action. 
4.2 The impact of Policy Networks 
Börzel argues that policy networks “draws attention to the interaction of many but 
interdependent organisations which co-ordinate their actions through 
interdependencies of resources and interests.” (1997: 4) Who are the interest 
groups that tried to influence the outcome of REACH? There can be said to be 
two different kinds of lobby organisations; the first one is representing the 
interests of companies and function as umbrella organisations; whose aim is to 
coordinate the overall interests of the companies and organisations it is 
representing. The other type of lobby organisation takes charge for assignments 
ordered by specific actors (Hix, 2005: 213; Interview with Lena Perenius, 
070425). 
The industry: It might be wrong to talk about the industry as one constituent 
since it consists of different kind of enterprises whose interests in REACH can 
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differ to a some extent, however one of the most influential lobby organisations 
was CEFIC, which is an umbrella organisation for the European industry and it is 
also the largest business group in terms of staff employing around 80 people (Hix, 
2005: 214). CEFIC worked for the broad questions in REACH that were 
interesting for the chemical industry. Lena Perenius, now working for CEFIC, 
were working for Eurometaux, which in difference to CEFIC were lobbying for 
specific questions affecting specific interest of that industry; a narrower 
perspective. The goal for the chemical industry was to get a well-balanced 
compromise, where the demands for competitiveness were most important. As 
stated in the introductory chapter all stakeholders wanted a new chemical 
Regulation, although they did not agree on the details. The industry also lobbied 
in the member states to a great extend for instance in Germany and in Poland. 
Environmental groups: The main environmentalist advocates were NGOs such 
as WWF, EEB (European Environmental Bureau), Friends of the earth and 
Greenpeace. They can be said to be representing the public interests of European 
citizens, whereas the industry foremost represents the private sector (Hix, 2005: 
212).  As well as the industry the environmental groups made assessment studies 
and conducted traditional lobbying, although the resources compared to industry 
was far less. Naturally the environmentalists foremost lobbied on the Commission 
and the Parliament, although also on the member states. 
Other groups: There were many organisations lobbying on REACH among 
the most important were consumer organisations such as BEUC (European 
Consumers’ Organisation), oganisations representing the social partners such as 
ETUC (the European Trade Union Confederation) and ECEG (European 
Chemical Employers Group), which has tide knots with the industry lobby 
otganisations. Also the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) gave opinions on the proposal. 
Non-European Countries: REACH raised concerns among non-European 
countries. In 2004 Colin Powell at that time the secretary of the state, send out a 
cable to all US embassies in EU member states questioning future trade relations 
(Bilefsky, International Herald Tribune, 061012). Unites States also together with 
12 other non-European countries called on the Commission to further water down 
REACH because of worries about the consequences for trade (Young, Chemical 
Week, 060621). 
The institutions that was most interesting for lobbyism were the Commission 
and the EP. Lena Perenius means that you try influencing everyone that have an 
influential role in the negotiations. For instance the Commission had already done 
their part and in the final negotiations they were not that attracted to lobbyists. 
Instead the interests were directed towards the rapporteurs in the EP and towards 
the Presidency. The industry made “package solutions” to both the EP and the 
Presidency. The strategy was to contact for instance parliamentarians that have 
something in common with their interest and they proceed to their networks and 
parliament groups (Interview with Lena Perenius, 070425). And clearly the 
industry had more contact with DG enterprise and Commissioner Verheugen 
rather than with DG environment. She also says that they should not have had any 
insight in the trialogues, but unofficially they had (ibid.) Chris Davies argues that 
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the industry lobbying were more intense in the beginning of the negotiations also 
in the Parliament. According to him they were concentrating on people they knew 
they could win over and after the first reading the positions of the 
parliamentarians were known and the lobbying from industry decreased. This was 
also due to that the position between the Parliament and the Council was not that 
far apart; instead focus became narrower and narrower. The lobbying was also 
conducted at different levels; both at the national and the EU-arena. In the second 
reading some concessions were done to the industry: “in a concession to the 
chemicals industry, some of the substances will be approved if producers show 
that they can be adequately controlled.” (The Parliament – “EU prepares to close 
chapter on REACH”, 061211)  
In sum, policy networks contain actors at all different levels in the EU as well 
as in the member states. I have foremost focused on the lobbyism although it is 
important to realise that REACH was negotiated at different levels; in the party 
groups in the Parliament, between civil servants in the different DGs in the 
Commission, between Permanent representatives in COREPER and between civil 
servants in the Commission and civil servants in the member states or MEPs. The 
negotiations should be regarded as an ongoing process of informal and formal 
negotiations between different actors at different levels. 
4.3 The Presence of Communicative action 
In the REACH negotiations both arguing and bargaining were present. According 
to Holzinger bargaining is used to set the framework on the big questions, 
whereas arguing comes in later to solve detailed questions (in Müller, 2004: 272). 
 In the early negotiations the question were not so politicised since ad hoc-
groups were going through the proposal. After a while the positions of the 
member states were outlined and occasionally REACH was discussed in the 
Council of Ministers. During the Luxembourg Presidency when the proposal was 
outlined foremost experts were participating in the negotiations, according to Per 
Bergman there were little political discussions (Interview 070418). As mentioned 
earlier during the Italian Presidency the REACH moved from the environment 
Council to the Council of competition. The 20
th
 of September in 2003 The British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, the French President Jacques Chirac and the German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder published a joint letter on their concern for the 
industrial competitiveness in Europe: “A future EU chemicals policy must be 
designed in such a way as to ensure environmental, health and consumer 
protection without endangering the international competitiveness of the European 
chemical industry.” (Présidence de la Republique, 030920) I regard this joint 
letter as a threat with high political weight i.e. bargaining to a great extend. 
According to Per Bergman the positions in the Council were more polarised and 
political in the early negotiations. In the end the political interest was not that 
high, but then the political main questions were already solved, for instance that 
of intellectual property rights (Interview with Per Bergman, 070418).  
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Also in the Parliament there were from times to times negotiations characterised 
as bargaining. Early in the negotiations the EPP-ED took a position that were 
unacceptable for any of the other party groups in the Parliament and the other 
shadow rapporteurs made sure that Sacconi were not going to go too far towards 
making a compromise with EPP-ED, according to Chris Davies it was hard 
bargaining and “a bit of shouting” (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510). In the 
inter-institutional negotiations bargaining was also part of the negotiations. The 
Council did not move their common position an inch until just in the end, which I 
claim was in order to avoid conciliation. However some party groups in the 
Parliament (the Greens, GUE/NLG) threatened to push the negotiations further to 
conciliation, but this was avoided because of the agreement between EPP-ED 
(that wanted to avoid conciliation), PES and ALDE. So are the conditions for 
arguing present in the negotiations? 
Shared life world: A common understanding for the “games of the play” and 
common values and norms function as basic prerequisites for communicative 
action. In the REACH negotiations all parties shared a common life world where 
norms and values can be said are rested in the institutional structures. The central 
claim for new institutionalists is that institutions matters and that they are key 
players in their own right (March – Olsen, 1984: 738). New institutionalism 
includes both formal and informal rules, such as norms, informal conventions and 
values (Peterson - Bomberg in Nelsen – Stubb, 2003: 324-325). All actors in the 
REACH negotiations shared a common life world and were aware of the rules of 
the game. 
Lack of knowledge and uncertainties: When there is lack of knowledge or 
uncertainties actors tend to use communicative action as a way to solve problems. 
REACH was an extremely technical and complex multi-questioned proposal and 
this might have given rise to communicative action in order to find new 
information and to consider different views. I claim that both parties used 
informal information from lobby groups to gain knowledge and the Commission 
relied on the impact assessment studies demanded by industries
6
. However lack of 
knowledge was more present in the beginning of the negotiations when actors 
tried to outline the texts. In the beginning even Sacconi got expert help from the 
Commission in order to interpret the texts. Lack of knowledge can also mean that 
the institutions are unaware of the intentions and positions of one another; in the 
case of REACH policy networks and the trialogues helped to clarify positions. 
Niemann claims that expert knowledge can be required in order to outline the 
other negotiators proposition (Niemann, 2004: 385). Since REACH was a 
complex issue, policy networks and technical expertise were important in order to 
outline the positions; however the question became more politicised throughout 
the process and bargaining occurred when the technical expertise had had their 
say.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6 Altough environmental groups and animal right groups were present (impact assessment study by KPMG, 
2005: 1) 
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The possibility for lengthy discussions: “For an argumentative discussion to take 
place or a reasoned consensus to emerge, time is required[.]” (Niemann, 2004: 
386) The trialogues play a crucial role, when it comes to time. In the REACH 
negotiations there were six trialogue sessions, which can be described as a forum 
where the head negotiators of the Council, the Commission and the EP meet to 
discuss their standpoints in order to reach a compromise. The trialogues are only 
about one hour long, which does not give a possibility for lengthy discussions, 
however discussions also take place “in the corridors”. Jens Holm means that it is 
too little face-to-face meetings, so the chance to discuss the questions in detail are 
very small. Also the informal discussions in the corridors are difficult to get 
support on from your party group or even less from your party back home 
(Interview Jens Holm, 070420). Since questions often are technical the 
negotiations in the trialogues can be difficult, but it is a way to communicate and 
to conclude (Interview with Lena Perenius, 070425). Chris Davies saw the 
trialogues as a waste of time since the Council did not change its position until in 
the last trialogue (Interview with Chris Davies, 070510). However REACH had 
been negotiated since the Commission proposal in 2003 so the negotiators were 
familiar with the technicalities, however new questions arose throughout the 
process and the time was still limited in order to go through all details.   
Persuasive individuals: Communicative action means that individuals are 
open for persuasion and that the better argument will change the mind of other 
actors. Since they already had come that far in the REACH negotiations and that 
the positions between the Council and the Parliament were not that far apart a 
compromise was unavoidable. The preferences of the actors were more or less 
fixed; instead it was a matter of how far you could stretch them. None of the 
actors would turn their position completely; it was rather a question on how good 
the negotiators were to make them stretch their preferences. As mentioned earlier 
I argue that the threat for conciliation helped the Council to stretch their 
preferences this is also the case of EPP-ED. The final compromise in the 
Parliament was because the environment spokesperson in EPP-ED coordinated 
the positions of the PES; EPP-ED and ALDE. Being the environment 
spokesperson gave him legitimacy and trust so that a compromise could be 
reached. The Finnish Presidency also had the political will to make a final 
compromise (Pekkarinen, 061027), and it all happened in the shadow of 
conciliation. 
In sum the REACH negotiations have involved both hard bargaining and 
arguing. Hard bargaining were more common in the early negotiations when 
positions just had been outlined, for instance when the joint letter from Blair, 
Schröder and Chirac were published, or when the EPP-ED refused to change their 
position. Most of the conditions for arguing are present in the negotiations, all 
actors share a common life world and accepted the rules of the game. REACH 
was a highly technical and complex question where policy networks and technical 
expertise were vital in order to be able to negotiate, also the negotiations were 
lengthy since it had been going on for three years and finally pesuasive 
individuals made the compromise possible. Arguing made the compromise on 
REACH possible.    
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5 Conclusion 
Why did the negotiations on REACH result in the specific outcome that is on the 
table now? By using two-level game the importance of studying the two levels as 
inderdepandant levels rather than as separate units are significant. First 
preferences and coalitions at both levels were described; in the Council the 
coalitions can be regarded as an environmental camp versus an industry-camp; 
where the Northern countries share the same environmental norms, but at the 
same time do not have a chemical industry to talk of. In the industry-friendly 
countries the chemical industry employs large parts of the population and the 
industry itself are one of the largest producers or manufacturers in the country, for 
instance in Germany.  
In the Parliament the same division line between environmentalists and 
industry friends are present, however the question is also a matter of power, where 
the larger party groups tend to make coalitions because of self-interest and to be 
able to act as a counterbalance towards the Council. In order to negotiate at Level 
1 intra-institutional compromises between coalitions have to be done at Level 2. 
The system of intra- and- inter institutional negotiations is due to the institutional 
structure i.e. the co-decision procedure where the European Parliament and the 
Council function as co-legislators. I argue that the threat of conciliation had an 
impact on the outcome of the negotiations; where the Council and the EPP-ED 
moved their positions towards a compromise to avoid conciliation.  
The strategies of the negotiators differed depending on which level they were 
negotiating. In the Parliament the chief negotiator Sacconi tried to reach 
consensus and were even accused of being too consensus-minded. However in the 
negotiations with the Council the strategy was not to change the position, but 
rather to stretch it in order to agree on a compromise. The Council leadership was 
held by the Presidency, where England made an impressive role as a mediator and 
even seemed to have convinced the German industry on the compromise of 
Registration. In the end game Finland held the Presidency and acted as an 
impartial leader, even though its position from the beginning corresponded to the 
environmentalists. The Finns made a “take-it-or-leave-it” package that all parties 
finally agreed on. However, I claim that two-level game is not a sufficient theory 
in explaining the outcome of the REACH negotiations. The negotiations were not 
just held at two levels, they were held in policy networks. These policy networks 
involved all actors that had an interest in REACH i.e. civil servants in the 
different DGs, industry and environmental lobbyists, MEPs, politicians in the 
member states, permanent representatives in the COREPER and so on. I argue 
that all these policy networks helped in order to reach a compromise, most of all 
because REACH was a highly technical and complex issue consisting of various 
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degrees of elements. The policy networks were necessary in order to discuss and 
negotiate the details on REACH somewhat effectively.  
Finally, in order to negotiate REACH the concepts of arguing and bargaining 
are present. Since REACH is a technical issue the first negotiations were held by 
technical experts in order to outline positions and technical details. During the 
process the question became more politisised and bargaining started to occur, 
however bargaining tend to create deadlocks and in order to avoid these the actors 
started to conduct arguing. Bargaining can be said to have set the framework 
whereas arguing was needed when negotiating on details. The conditions for 
arguing i.e. sharing of a common life world, technical and complex issues, time 
for lengthy discussions and persuasive individuals were all present in the REACH 
negotiations.  
In sum, the “acceptable” outcome of the REACH negotiations can be 
explained by the institutional structure i.e. the co-decision procedure which gives 
rise to coalitions and policy networks. Because of the technicality and complexity 
of REACH policy networks together with arguing helped the actors to reach a 
compromise that were acceptable to all stakeholders. 
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